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The Sustainability Challenge (pre-proof version) 
 
 
The Sustainability Transition 
 
The global sustainability challenge facing us is simply stated: it combines an empirical 
assessment and a normative claim. The evidence-based assessment, as shared by 
numerous scientists, is that current society-nature interactions are not sustainable – they 
are negatively affecting both vital ecological systems and human welfare in ways that 
threaten irreversible, long-term damage (UNEP 2007). Attached to this empirical claim is 
the normative position of sustainable development; that societal development paths should 
meet fundamental human needs, within and between generations, while maintaining the 
planet’s life-support system and conserving living resources. 
 
Of course, the most well known vision of sustainable development has been the one 
promoted within the United Nations (UN), from the Brundtland Commission to the 1992 Rio 
Conference and the 2002 Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development. It is 
broadly a social democratic understanding, which states that a durable commitment to 
poverty eradication, delivered through inclusive governance structures and more equitable 
economic growth, must run alongside measures to reverse the continuing degradation of 
the global environment. In other words, that which is to be ‘sustained’ is human 
development for all alongside necessary ecosystem services. 
 
This commitment to sustainable development was revitalized at the 2005 World Summit, 
held at the UN Headquarters in New York. Managing and protecting a common 
environment was seen as necessary to delivering those UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) targeting the poorest and most vulnerable, including efforts to halve, by 
2015, the proportion of the world’s population living on less than $1 a day and the 
proportion lacking access to safe drinking water or proper sanitation. World leaders at the 
World Summit also recognized that the core objectives of sustainable development must 
include addressing the serious, long-term global challenge of climate change. Here the 
international community reaffirmed the ultimate objective of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
 
Notwithstanding the shared commitments of the World Summit, by the end of the decade 
the sustainable development paradigm was in trouble: the 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
signalled divergent opinions between states (especially between the global Northern and 
Southern countries) about how to tackle dangerous climate change, while progress 
towards the MDGs had slowed or even reversed as a result of the global economic crisis 
(UN 2009). Moreover, the Doha Development Agenda being negotiated at the World 
Trade Organization had stalled. The international community continued to acknowledge 
sustainable development as a common goal, but deep political differences between 
developed and developing countries were eroding the potential for renewed multilateral 
cooperation. 
 
General recognition of the global sustainability challenge thus masks significant 
disagreements about the means of addressing it effectively. The UN formulation of 
sustainable development attempts to circumvent this lack of agreement by promoting 
diverse modalities of action for sustainability, pulling in multiple actors and decision-
making processes, such as the use of voluntary partnerships between public and private 
actors. And this plurality of governance forms is more than a political adaptation to an 
international arena where consensus on rule making for sustainable development is 
proving elusive. It also reveals a wish to embed sustainability beliefs in the daily economic 
and social practices of peoples around the world. 
 
This governance response still leaves the UN framework of sustainable development with 
the problem of how to reconcile ecological and social sustainability with the unsustainable 
structures and trends of current patterns of economic growth. Under the UN model, it has 
been assumed that market-led growth can deliver human development goals without major 
structural changes in production and consumption patterns. Yet, as the challenge of 
climate change has made obvious, without political and regulatory checks market-led 
actors seem compelled to externalize social and environmental costs (Stern 2009). This 
chapter outlines a view that the necessary conditions for an effective transition to 
sustainability must therefore be comprehensive, encompassing far-reaching changes in 
economic-technological, regulatory and democratic choices. A central claim is that 
sustainability proponents can no longer avoid facing the transformative political character 
of this transition – one that is compatible neither with free market ideologies (e.g. Anglo-




Economic and technological conditions for sustainability 
 
Undoubtedly the greatest challenge in the transition to sustainability is the structural 
realignment of our dominant economic development paths away from energy- and 
material-intensive processes. Shaped by academic debates and policy choices in northern 
European countries, the most influential perspective on the economic and technological 
conditions conducive to sustainability is ‘ecological modernization’. This approach 
advocates the greening of production processes through technological innovation, offering 
‘win-win’ solutions: to corporate actors from more efficient resource and energy use; to 
employees and communities from less pollution; and to governments from investment 
patterns in line with ambitious productivity and regulatory targets. Ecological modernization 
gains have been significant in many industrialized states, but fall short of the economic 
dematerialization and decarbonization gains necessary for delivering environmental 
sustainability. 
 
Economic advances towards sustainability are observable in the widespread embrace of 
eco-efficiency by businesses; that is, strategies for creating economic value with less 
environmental impact. Eco-efficient  corporations aim to decouple resource consumption, 
energy use and pollution emissions from economic activity, as well as capture productivity 
increases from knowledge-based innovation. As promoted by organizations such as the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the eco-efficiency perspective has 
brought a growing repertoire of practical solutions for moving corporations towards 
sustainability. Leading corporate proponents of this approach include the Canon Group 
(through an extensive green procurement policy), Hyundai Electronics (by reducing 
chemical usage in the production of semi-conductors), and Walmart (by actively seeking to 
meet all energy needs from renewable sources and creating zero waste). 
 
That such large corporations can push through eco-efficiency strategies is evidence that 
the business community can meet significant environmental challenges, although effective 
diffusion of these practices requires a supportive cross-national platform of regulatory 
norms and green taxation incentives. There is a concern that ecological modernization is 
designed to maintain the economic advantages of existing global business elites, and 
actually blunts a more far-reaching sustainability challenge, which would include corporate 
social responsibility demands. To be sure, global voluntary schemes – including the Global 
Reporting Initiative, the UN Global Compact and the ISO 26000 guidelines for social 
responsibility – demonstrate that many major corporations are willing to be subjected to 
public scrutiny for their economic, environmental and social performance. By 2009, for 
example, over 5200 businesses in 130 countries were listed by the Global Compact as 
having committed to its ten core principles covering human rights, labour recognition, 
environmental sustainability and anti-corruption (see: http://www.unglobalcompact.org). 
However, the Global Compact has struggled in recent years to respond to criticisms that it 
has not effectively scrutinized the sustainability impacts of its members. And in March 
2009, in the face of the serious corporate failings that triggered the 2008-2009 global 
economic crisis, the Board of the Global Reporting Initiative took the unprecedented step 
of calling on governments to make sustainability reporting mandatory for private 
corporations and public bodies. 
 
Furthermore, while such voluntary commitments to sustainability assessment of corporate 
performance promote relevant business engagement, they do not address the growing 
scale of production and consumption historically associated with the global economy. 
Indeed, there are grounds for anticipating that the efficiency gains arising from less intense 
energy and material use in economic production will, over time, be wiped out by the 
resource demands of increased consumption in a developing world. This so-called 
‘rebound effect’ highlights why the ecological restructuring of production must be 
accompanied by efforts to rein back overconsumption in affluent societies (Murphy 2007). 
Ultimately, the sustainability transition means a far-reaching reform of economic activity, 
such that wealth creation drivers are tamed by shared social and ecological needs (e.g. 
reduction of working time, investment in public goods, community-oriented technologies). 
 
 
Regulating for sustainability 
 
Adger and Jordan (2009) have rightly stated that the crisis of unsustainability is, above all, 
a crisis of governance. The transition to sustainability will not be achieved without recourse 
to radical changes in prevailing norms and institutional forms for making collective 
decisions. To pretend otherwise is naively to suppose that those dominant free-market 
incentives favouring short-term private benefits will, without regulatory steering, somehow 
register vital environmental and social interests. Or that those groups profiting from 
unsustainable resource use, whether legally or illegally, could be persuaded to forfeit their 
material gains for the good of more vulnerable communities or future generations. Neither 
scenario is realistic: the challenge to regulate for sustainability is thus formidable. It 
necessitates the introduction of creative and flexible regulatory practices that are problem-
led, rather than anchored in fixed organizational or ideological structures. These regulatory 
forms are best thought of as networks: they protect and promote sustainability at multiple 
scales, bringing actors together in new configurations of mutual learning and collective 
control. 
 
Some recent trends in environmental policy making within industrialized countries offer a 
sense of the types of regulatory networks likely to be both effective and democratically 
legitimate in any sustainability transition. Their starting point is the acknowledgement that 
government command and control regulation in pursuit of public interest goals is often, by 
itself, not sufficient to compel durable changes in behaviour. Rather, direct state 
intervention is more likely to be effective when used strategically and selectively: the 
pivotal role of government is to facilitate the creation of regulatory networks which recruit 
affected parties to shape and participate in sustainability rule-making and enforcement. 
 
Regulation, broadly defined, would be guided by overriding principles of sustainability 
(intra- and intergenerational justice, prevention of social and ecological harm), but in 
practice would draw pragmatically on a wider range of policy tools than traditional standard 
setting: these could include economic instruments (e.g. tradable pollution credits, taxes or 
fixed charges), voluntary undertakings (e.g. corporate codes of conduct) and 
communicative approaches (e.g. community right-to-know provisions, product 
certification). Above all, it would be problem-based regulation insofar as appropriate 
combinations of policy tools are tailored to specific contexts. The regulatory developments 
necessary to meet the complex demands of the sustainability transition will thus require 
policy experimentation and learning, and the participation of multiple actors. 
 
A fundamental shift in regulatory emphasis is called for to secure this transition – a move 
away from reactive, incremental policy making towards anticipatory, integrated 
approaches. For example, the focus of strategic environmental assessment on avoiding 
negative ecological impacts forecast to arise from policies, plans and programmes 
indicates the preventative intent that, when extended also to social and economic effects, 
constitutes the scope of sustainability assessment systems. The effective translation of 
sustainability commitments into practical assessment criteria and techniques is by no 
means easy (Gibson et al. 2005). Assessment in support of sustainability decision-making 
must combine the rigorous analysis of natural and social scientific data with an openness 
to real world problem-solving. 
 
Some of the more promising methods of sustainability assessment share a preoccupation 
with stakeholder participation in sustainability modelling and evaluation, in order to 
facilitate an inclusive dialogue on possible futures: this is designed both to incorporate 
information on what people want to be sustained and also, through a common ownership 
of the decision-making process, to boost incentives for behavioural change. Leading 
examples include the CSA (Community Sustainability Assessment) model 
(http://gen.ecovillage.org/activities/csa/English/) and the European MATISSE (Methods 
and Tools for Integrated Sustainability Assessments) framework (http://www.matisse-
project.net/projectcomm/index.php?id=67). Both approaches have been developed with a 
view to enabling citizens to learn about the social and environmental consequences of 
multiple future scenarios. Nevertheless, such sustainability assessments remain the 





The full political implications of the sustainability transition have yet to be grasped. 
Inherent to the conception of sustainable development championed by the UN is a 
commitment to intra- and intergenerational justice, which highlights the inequities of 
current resource allocation patterns around the globe. It is clear that ensuring an equal 
opportunity for all to satisfy their basic needs is not possible without a significant 
redistribution of resources from affluent groups to the world’s poor. Of course, the principle 
of equal opportunity also implies that individuals should not systematically be made 
socially vulnerable or exposed to human induced environmental hazards. In considering 
possible civic-political conditions for promoting sustainability, the critical benchmark is the 
extent to which they empower individuals to identify and claim their sustainability 
entitlements as planetary citizens; that is, their equal rights to human and ecological 
security. 
 
What constitutes legitimate sustainability constraints on political economic structures is by 
no means straightforward to specify, as much depends on particular institutional and 
cultural contexts. However, as most countries already grant, through the ascription of 
rights, moral and legal protection to the civic-political conditions under which persons can 
freely determine their life paths, it seems logical that this protection should be extended to 
sustainability constraints that relate to vital conditions of existence; for example, economic 
subsistence and livelihood opportunities, social welfare entitlements, clean air and water, 
and ecologically sustainable land use. In other words, there are convincing reasons for 
applying human rights norms to at least some aspects of sustainability. 
 
The universality of human rights captures well the sustainability principle that conditions of 
life should be maintained that keep open the fullest range of options for the future, while 
meeting fairly the needs of everyone in the present; that is, political and economic 
development paths should not be making the socially marginalized or our successors 
worse off. Unlike civil-political rights, which are widely embedded in national constitutions 
and international human rights conventions, the notion that critical social and ecological 
conditions of existence should be recognized in this way remains controversial. It also sits 
uneasily with that Anglo-American market fundamentalism which perceives only individual 
liberty rights to be relevant to wellbeing. Nevertheless, the sustainability challenge here is 
for concerned citizens to build political support for domestic and international rights 
protection of vital conditions of life (e.g. a human right not to suffer significant harm as a 
result of dangerous climate change). 
 
Beyond moves to entrench core sustainability entitlements in resource allocation 
decisions, there remains the less salient, but no less demanding, task of fostering a 
widespread socio-cultural identification with sustainable development. As Tim O’Riordan 
(2009) notes, governance for sustainability needs to foster conditions and incentives for 
civic virtue and comprehensive wellbeing. A preoccupation in policy circles with economic 
and regulatory reform has neglected the role of civic education and socialization in 
transmitting pro-sustainability values. In a highly interdependent world, a necessary 
political source of identification with sustainability is that those facing threats to their 
wellbeing from particular material transactions are able collectively to perceive these as 
adversely affecting their interests and therefore in need of regulation, They are able, in 
other words, to attribute responsibility to external actors or structures, and identify with 
others whose sustainability entitlements are also being eroded. Empathy with the socially 
excluded is key to the cultivation of values and norms in support of sustainability; as also, 
of course, is the consideration of the needs of future generations. What is required here is 
not revolutionary: it is an extension outwards of social norms already operational in all 
durable human cultures; for example, positive concern for the young and other vulnerable 





This discussion, albeit necessarily brief, has highlighted several necessary framework 
conditions for a meaningful sustainability transition: 
 • a structural realignment of economic development objectives, combining 
dematerialization and eco-efficiency with socially just wealth creation;
 
• the effective integration of regulation for sustainability (including climate change 
governance) across policy sectors as well as political borders;
 
• the routine employment, in decision-making, of sustainability assessment informed by 
extensive stakeholder participation
 
• the ascription of rights protection to critical sustainability entitlements for all planetary 
citizens (e.g. economic security, social welfare provision, vital ecological conditions of 
existence); and
 
• the promotion of altruistic, ecologically enlightened social identities 
 
The specific institutional designs in support of these conditions will be shaped by local and 
regional contexts: there is no simple template for change. While the global spread of 
democracy offers grounds for anticipating governance forms sensitive in principle to the 
sustainability transition, it will be still be necessary to convince key authoritarian states 
(e.g. China, Russia, the oil-rich Gulf states) to act in ways consistent with it. Furthermore, 
as evident from the charged ideological debate on climate change, political and social 
support for sustainability actions is far from assured even in the liberal democracies. This 
suggests the need for significant ongoing investments in sustainability education within 
and across different societies. 
 
In its recent comprehensive appraisal of the state of the global environment, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) presents four future scenarios over the next 40 
years (2007, pp395-454). The ‘markets first’ scenario anticipates economic liberalization 
continuing as the main driver of development paths around the world, in line with the still 
prevalent influence of market liberalism on leading industrialized states and international 
economic organizations. Indeed, the ideological hold of markets-first thinking in economic 
governance has survived the weak regulatory responses to the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis and associated recession. As UNEP acknowledges, while it is necessary to harness 
the innate capacity of markets for technological innovation and wealth creation, relying on 
markets alone is unlikely to deliver environmental and social sustainability. 
 
Adoption of a ‘markets first’ scenario would, compared to other scenarios, significantly 
increase global environmental harm, including a greater risk of dangerous climate change. 
An alternative ‘policy first’ scenario, where key governance institutions are strengthened to 
address environmental and social goals, delivers greater but still modest sustainability 
gains. This planetary future finds resonance in existing policy commitments to ecological 
modernization, although no provision is made for the rebound effect already mentioned, 
nor for the high levels of citizen participation and identification needed to ensure a 
successful sustainability transition. 
 
Indeed, as the UNEP report makes clear, to the realize the latter requires an historically 
unprecedented recasting of governance institutions according to sustainability criteria. The 
‘sustainability first’ scenario to 2050 encompasses a full application of the framework 
conditions outlined in this chapter. Sustainability concerns are incorporated into 
governance across levels, sectors and through time. Above all, human development and 
environmental quality priorities, as collectively shaped by local and transnational publics, 
steer market forces.  
 
The many examples of innovative environmental management practices found in this book 
attest to the real possibilities for advancing policies for ecological sustainability. Such 
policies, if conjoined with progress in meeting the MDGs by 2015, would mark significant 
global progress towards environmental and social sustainability. However, they demand a 
level of international cooperation and civil society engagement at odds with the prevailing 
geopolitical climate – one that is best captured by the ‘security first’  scenario in the UNEP 
assessment. Accounting for the current influence of this paradigm is the perceived threat 
to the global order of religious fundamentalist movements and violent criminal networks. 
This scenario thus includes increasing security expenditures by states at the expense of 
social and environmental investments, as well as inter-state competition to secure 
strategic resources (notably energy supplies). In a ‘security first’ world, international 
cooperation is even more difficult as states pursue narrow self-interests, evident in the 
growing ‘securitization’ of climate change, with states preparing themselves against the 
imagined threats of future ‘water wars’ and waves of climate refugees. Sustainability 
advocates across the world have, as their challenge, to impress on their governments and 
fellow citizens the conviction that long-term global security and prosperity rests not on 
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